On Mutual Ontological Affinity (Sīnkhīyyah)

There must be a reason for the emanation or the procession of a particular effect, to the exclusion of all the other effects, from a particular cause, to the exclusion of all the other causes that marks the procession of the former from the latter. That is to say, that there must be a mutual ontological affinity (sīnkhīyyah) between the cause and its corresponding effect that marks the procession of a particular effect, to the exclusion of all the other effects, from a particular cause, to the exclusion of all the other causes. In the absence of a mutual ontological affinity between a cause and its corresponding effect, just about anything could be the cause of anything, and just about anything could be the effect of anything, and this is contrary to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). This is because, in the absence of a mutual ontological affinity, no cause would have any priority over all the other potential-causes for being the principle of a certain effect, and no effect would have any priority over all the other potential-effects for proceeding from a certain cause.