Against a Libertarian Free Will view of God’s Will

If it were possible for God to act otherwise, and to choose between possible alternatives, in a manner similar to human agents, and if this mere possibility were sufficient in itself for the realization or the necessitation of the possible alternatives, then, all the possible alternatives ought to be realized into existence, and not just any one particular alternative to the exclusion of the others. For instance, if it were possible for God to necessitate the existence of ‘x’, and to refrain from necessitating the existence of ‘x’, and if this mere possibility were sufficient in itself for the necessitation, or the realization, of both the existence of ‘x’, as well as its nonexistence, then, ‘x’ should both exist and not exist simultaneously, but this emails a contradiction. And if this mere possibility were sufficient in itself for the necessitation, or the realization, of both the existence of ‘x’, as well as its nonexistence, then, given the eternity of this possibility, both the existence of ‘x’, as well as its nonexistence, ought to be necessitated from eternity. Therefore, ‘x’ would both exist, and not exist, from eternity, and this also implies a contradiction. The impossibility demonstrated here, is an essential impossibility, and, therefore, does not negate the omnipotence of God, because His potency only pertains to the essentially possible, and not to that which is impossible in itself.